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THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR AG-GAG LAWS
Jacquelyn M. Lyons*
I. INTRODUCTION
A video begins with a cow lying on her side on a concrete floor,
one end of a chain wrapped around her neck and the other attached
to a tractor.1 A man drives the tractor around the floor, down a ramp,
and outside onto the ground.2 This video, which was recorded at the
Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy in Idaho, proceeds to show other
cows in metal stalls being whipped, punched, and jumped on as they
attempt to escape their abusers.3 Videos like this one are typically
recorded by undercover investigators—journalists or animal activists
who pose as industry workers to blow the whistle on illegal activities
and, specifically, animal abuse.4 By acquiring and sharing footage of
animal abuse and unsafe working conditions, the undercover
investigators hope the public will learn of these atrocities and voice its
disapproval of the conditions, prompting the authorities to act and
change to occur within the agricultural industry.5
Following the release of this video and the ensuing negative
publicity, the Idaho Dairymen’s Association drafted a bill that
proposed to criminalize undercover investigations that exposed these
activities on farms, which the Idaho legislature quickly passed into law
on February 14, 2014.6 However, on August 3, 2015, an Idaho federal
district court judge declared the statute unconstitutional in Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Otter on the basis of the First Amendment right to

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Lehigh University.
1
Idaho Workers Charged with Animal Cruelty at Bettencourt Dairies’ Dry Creek Dairy,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 1:28 AM), http://landing.newsinc.com/shared/video
.html?vcid=23841440&freewheel=90051&sitesection=nydailynews.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Hiding the Truth About Factory Farms, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/opinion/27wed3.html.
5
Torment of Dairy Cows in Undercover Video Leads to Cruelty Charges, NBC NEWS (Oct.
10, 2012, 12:26 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/10/14343360torment-of-dairy-cows-in-undercover-video-leads-to-cruelty-charges?lite.
6
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199 (D. Idaho 2015).
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free speech.7
Not long before Animal Legal Defense Fund, on June 18, 2015, the
Supreme Court of the United States arguably expanded the definition
of “content based speech” in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, thus marking an
“important shift toward treating countless laws that regulate speech
with exceptional skepticism.”8 The Court addressed a challenge to a
town code that identified specific categories of signs based on their
content and subjected those signs to various levels of restriction.9 In
addition to striking down the ordinance under First Amendment free
speech principles, Justice Thomas went further to discuss what exactly
constitutes “content-based speech.”10 Analyses of the opinion interpret
the ruling to conclude that any law that singles out a topic for
regulation discriminates based on content, and is, therefore, subject to
strict scrutiny.11
This Comment will argue that not only are the majority of “ag-gag
laws”12 per se unconstitutional, but also that the recent Animal Legal
Defense Fund decision coupled with the Reed decision should prompt
the legislative and judiciary systems to reform or strike down the
remaining ag-gag laws altogether. Part II of this Comment will look
generally at how ag-gag laws implicate First Amendment issues. Part
III will take an in-depth look into the Idaho statute challenged in
Animal Legal Defense Fund and pinpoint what the Court specifically
identified as unconstitutional. Part IV will consider the impact of the
Reed decision on ag-gag laws and discuss future implications for
existing ag-gag laws that arise from considering Animal Legal Defense
Fund and Reed in tandem, including why the remaining statutes cannot
survive strict scrutiny. Part V will conclude by recommending actions
that can be taken by the legislature and judiciary to combat these
unconstitutional statutes.

7

Id. at 1199–200.
Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far Reaching Consequences, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courtsfree-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html; Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015).
9
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224.
10
Id. at 2227.
11
Liptak, supra note 8.
12
Ag-gag refers to state laws that prohibit the act of undercover filming or
photography of activity on farms without the owner’s consent. What is Ag-Gag
Legislation?, AM. SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, https://www.aspca
.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/what-ag-gag-legislation (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
Ag-gag laws particularly target undercover journalists or whistleblowers of animal
rights abuses at these facilities. Id.
8
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II. ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION TO
AG-GAG LAWS
The term “ag-gag” refers to agricultural operation “gag laws,” or
laws that restrict freedom of the press and free speech.13 While ag-gag
laws vary in their structure and specificity, they typically criminalize
undercover investigations of any agricultural operations, such as dairy,
poultry, and pork farms.14 The ag-gag laws generally target three
categories: (1) dishonesty in the job-application process, when the
applicant has the intention of infiltrating the facility to investigate; (2)
photographing or videotaping on agricultural facilities; and (3) the
possession or distribution of such videos.15 Although ag-gag laws take
various forms, they ultimately share a similar goal: to stop
whistleblowers from revealing what occurs at agricultural facilities.16
Objections to these ag-gag statutes largely stem from the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.17 Indeed, the effect of many
of these ag-gag statutes is a suppression of speech of undercover
investigators and whistleblowers, which not only affects the treatment
and health of farm animals, but also public safety, agricultural worker
safety, and the environment.18 This suppression of speech directly
implicates issues under the First Amendment, which states, “Congress
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”19 Courts should
find that the medium and content of the speech are protected by the
First Amendment, and they should utilize a strict scrutiny standard to
review ag-gag laws.
First, the medium of video recordings is protected speech under
the First Amendment.20 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Cuviello v. City of Oakland, utilized a framework to
specifically identify when the right to videotape was protected by free
13

Id.
Id.
15
Kevin C. Adam, Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag”
Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2012).
16
Traci Hobson, Factory Farming in America, Part 4: The Proliferation of Ag-Gag
Legislation, IAN SOMERHALDER FOUND. (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.isfoundation.com/
campaign/factory-farming-america-part-4-proliferation-ag-gag-legislation.
17
See Kurt Michael Friese, Gagging on the Ag Gag Bill - Industrial Lobbying and
Corporate Overreach at Its Finest, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2011), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/kurt-friese/farm-animal-abuse_b_872867.html.
18
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201 (D. Idaho 2015).
19
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20
Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. C-06-5517 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833,
at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007), aff’d, 434 F. App’x 615 (9th Cir. 2011).
14
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speech.21 In Cuviello, a group of animal-rights activists were stopped as
they stood on an access ramp to photograph and videotape the
treatment of circus animals in a public facility.22 The court ruled that
the activists were exercising their right to free speech because they
were communicating the treatment of animals to the public and the
public was interested in this communication, thus confirming the
notion that communication via video is a constitutionally protected
medium of speech.23 Therefore, the majority of ag-gag laws, which
prohibit videotaping on private agricultural property, implicate issues
of protected speech.
Second, the content contained in the video recordings is
protected speech under the First Amendment. These videos depicting
animal abuse do not fall into any of the categories of unprotected
speech and should accordingly remain protected.24 The unprotected
categories of speech include obscenity,25 incitement,26 and fighting
words.27 Proponents of ag-gag laws may argue that lies should not be
protected speech; however, courts have held that lies are not
categorically outside First Amendment protection.28 Accordingly,
typical undercover investigation videos that depict the mistreatment of
animals and are released by journalists and animal rights activists do
not fall under any of these traditional unprotected categories.29
Third, strict scrutiny should apply under this First Amendment
analysis because the ag-gag laws are content based. Laws that are
content based must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, and the law must
be found to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest.30 Although Reed did not deal with the agricultural industry,
this decision arguably broadened the scope of the constitutional
connection to ag-gag laws. An argument could be made that laws were
previously content based if they were adopted to suppress speech with
21

Id.
Id. at *2–3.
23
Id. at *21–22.
24
Sonci Kingery, Note, The Agricultural Iron Curtain: Ag Gag Legislation and the
Threat to Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645, 664
(2012).
25
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
26
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
27
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
28
See discussion infra Part III.
29
Kingery, supra note 24, at 671–72.
30
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (quoting Sable
Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)) (“If a statute regulates speech
based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
Government interest.”).
22
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which the government disagreed.31
Yet, the Reed decision either modified or confirmed “content
based” to mean that any law that singles out a topic for regulation
discriminates based on content, and is, therefore, presumptively
unconstitutional.32 This could potentially create a new framework to
look at many statutes that target a specific topic, including the
agricultural industry. The legislative history of ag-gag statutes strongly
indicates that the purpose of the statutes is to suppress speech critical
of animal-agricultural practices, thus rendering the statute regulations
content based.33
Specifically, the Idaho statute was enacted as a reaction to the
release of a video depicting animal abuse. Idaho senators compared
animal rights investigators to “marauding invaders centuries ago who
swarmed into foreign territory and destroyed crops to starve foes into
submission.”34 The senator also referred to the investigation as
“terrorism,” and stated, “[t]his is the way you combat your enemies”
while defending the legislation.35 It is likely that a video showing an
agricultural facility in a positive light would not lead to the same legal
action and consequences as negative videos because the “victim” will
not incur any losses. However, since a negative video would likely cause
the victim to suffer losses due to public outcry from the mistreatment
of animals and workers, this negative depiction is the discernable
target of the ag-gag laws. This legislative and historical basis for the aggag laws implies that the statutes are directly intended to punish
animal activists and whistleblowers and are targeting speech that is
critical of agricultural production facilities. Therefore, it is likely that
courts will find that ag-gag laws single out and regulate the topic of
negative views of the agricultural industry, thus triggering a strict
scrutiny standard.
Finally, there are public policy concerns that demonstrate the
importance of a First Amendment inquiry. Specifically, the story of
Upton Sinclair is a “clear illustration” of how ag-gag statutes implicate
constitutional issues grounded in the First Amendment.36 Sinclair
obtained a job in the meat packing industry to acquire information for
a novel revealing unsanitary working conditions, and the atrocities he
31
32
33

See Liptak, supra note 8.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015).
See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1201 (D. Idaho

2015).
34
35
36

Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id. at 1201.
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uncovered ultimately led to the passage of the Pure Food and Drug
Act.37 Under nearly every ag-gag statute today, including the Idaho
statute, Sinclair would have been criminally prosecuted for his
conduct, either for obtaining employment under misrepresentation or
false pretenses or for publishing photographs of the animal facility.38
This story illustrates how agricultural operations that “affect food and
worker safety are not exclusively a private matter.”39 Without the
information obtained by undercover investigators, which is prohibited
under the current ag-gag laws, the public will likely never learn of
unsanitary or abusive conditions for animals or workers at agricultural
facilities. It is not probable that an agricultural facility will permit
members of the public to witness animal abuse or unsafe working
conditions that occur at their facility.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF IDAHO’S UNCONSTITUTIONAL AG-GAG LAW
The Idaho ag-gag statute, Idaho Code § 18-7042, criminalizes
“interference with agricultural production.”40 The statute provides, in
pertinent part, that a person commits this crime if the person
knowingly: (a) enters an agricultural production facility by force,
threat, misrepresentation or trespass; (b) obtains agricultural
production facility records by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass; (c) obtains employment with an agricultural production
facility by force, threat, or misrepresentation with the intent to cause
economic or other injury to the facility’s operations; (d) enters a
private agricultural production facility and, without the facility owner’s
express consent, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an
agricultural production facility’s operations.41 Violators of the statute face
up to one year in jail, and a journalist or whistleblower convicted can
be forced to pay damages for twice the economic loss a business suffers
as a result of any exposé revealing animal abuse or unsafe working
conditions.42
The court in Animal Legal Defense Fund lays out the steps to a First
Amendment challenge to ag-gag laws: (1) Plaintiff bears the burden of
“demonstrating that the First Amendment applies to the activity he or

37

Joe McGasko, Dispatches from the Jungle: The Writers Who Reformed America,
BIOGRAPHY (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.biography.com/news/the-jungle-uptonsinclair-whistleblowers-muckrakers.
38
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201–02.
39
Id. at 1202.
40
IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2015).
41
IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(a)-(e) (2015) (emphasis added).
42
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201.

LYONS (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/16/2017 1:18 PM

COMMENT

921

she claims is protected as expression;”43 (2) the court analyzes the
context in which the expression took place and then determines which
First Amendment standard applies;44 (3) the court then assesses
whether the government’s justifications for restricting the conduct or
speech satisfy the applicable standard.45
A. Animal Legal Defense Fund Found That Using Misrepresentation to
Gain Access to Agricultural Facilities is Protected by the First
Amendment
First, under the framework of First Amendment ag-gag
challenges, the plaintiff must establish that the prohibited activity is
protected under the First Amendment.46 Thus, the court analyzed
whether the “misrepresentation” requirement included in sections (a)(c) of the statute was a violation of the First Amendment.47 The Animal
Legal Defense Fund court utilized the analysis presented in United States
v. Alvarez.48 In Alvarez, the central issue was whether lies are
categorically outside First Amendment protection.49 The Alvarez Court
struck down a federal statute that made it a crime to misrepresent or
lie about receiving military decorations or medals on the ground that
it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.50 The
plurality found that “there must be a direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”51 The Court
explained that it rejected the Government’s claim because there was
no sufficient link between lies about military awards and the dilution
of the public’s perception of such honors, which was the asserted
harm.52
The Alvarez holding is critical in ag-gag cases because ag-gag laws
are framed to punish actions, including the recording of video, which
occur after a misrepresentation, specifically regarding an individual’s
identity. Based on the majority of ag-gag laws’ inclusion of a section
requiring misrepresentation to gain employment, agricultural facilities
43

Id. at 1202 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
n.5 (1984)).
44
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
45
Id.
46
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984).
47
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1203.
48
Id.
49
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012).
50
Id. at 2551.
51
Id. at 2549.
52
Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First
Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2015).
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may include questions on employment applications asking if potential
employees are pursuing employment in order to make unauthorized
recordings.53 Potential employees could face charges under certain aggag statutes54 just by misrepresenting themselves on this application
with the intent to make unauthorized recordings, even if they never
actually make an unauthorized recording.55 The Alvarez Court
importantly noted that the public has an interest in First Amendment
protection for false speech.56 Moreover, if the government has power
to punish false speech, this will lead to a chilling of free speech
stemming from the selective enforcement of the law against certain
groups.57
In Animal Legal Defense Fund, the State argued that the Alvarez
ruling did not apply to the Idaho statute because, unlike in Alvarez, the
“misrepresentations” in the Idaho statute only become criminal when
accompanied by a form of conduct such as “entering a facility,
acquiring its records, or seeking employment with the express purpose
of doing harm to the employer.”58 The Animal Legal Defense Fund court,
however, clarified that Alvarez did not strike down the statute because
it was not accompanied by conduct, but rather because the false
statements did not cause a “legally cognizable harm.”59 Certain
deceptive speech, such as perjury, fraud, and defamation, directly
causes material harm to those being misled.60 Since these types of
speech can directly cause material harm to individuals, the statutory
criminalization of these actions does not violate the First
Amendment.61 The court clarified that the Idaho statute is not limited
to directly harmful misrepresentation, but rather it prohibited “all lies
used to gain access to property, records, or employment—regardless

53

Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How
United States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 566, 569 (2014).
54
IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2013).
55
Liebmann, supra note 53, at 569.
56
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (“[T]he threat of criminal
prosecution for making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true
statements, thereby ‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s
heart.”).
57
Id.
58
Defendant Wasden’s Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9–
10, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D. Idaho 2015) (No. 1:14cv-00104-BLW).
59
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1203 (D. Idaho 2015)
(quoting Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545).
60
Id.
61
Id.
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of whether the misrepresentations themselves cause any material
harm.”62 Ag-gag laws reach far beyond laws prohibiting fraud, invasions
of privacy, or physical damage, which is harm that is not shielded by
free speech.63 In fact, the criminalized conduct of ag-gag laws does not
have to cause any injury other than the recording and exposure of
illegal or otherwise repugnant actions.64
In the case of the Idaho statute65 and likely in the case of many
other ag-gag laws, the harm would emerge later from the story or video
that is shared with the public, but the harm is not directly caused by
the misrepresentation made to gain access to the farm. In fact, the
Animal Legal Defense Fund court articulated that exposing this
misconduct to the public and “facilitating dialogue on issues of
considerable public interest” is precisely the type of speech the First
Amendment is designed to protect.66 Thus, like in Alvarez, a court
deciding the constitutionality of an ag-gag law will not likely find a
sufficient link between misrepresenting oneself to obtain employment
and the harm of public disapproval of agricultural industry actions.
The misrepresentation component of the Animal Legal Defense
Fund case is important, and it has far-reaching implications regarding
other ag-gag laws. Common sense can deduce that an agricultural
facility owner with abuse occurring on the premises would not
welcome an investigator, animal activist, or journalist to step foot on
the property or record video of the animal abuse. Therefore, one of
the limited ways these individuals can obtain access onto the property
is by misrepresenting their identity. If the court upheld the
“misrepresentation” prohibitions in this statute, the far-reaching
consequences may extend to all investigative journalism altogether.
B. Animal Legal Defense Fund Found That the Audiovisual Recording
Prohibitions Restrict Speech Protected by the First Amendment and
Discriminate Based on Content and Viewpoint
Next, the Animal Legal Defense Fund court looked at the audiovisual
recording prohibition in Section D.67 The court decided that the
specific provision not only restricted a medium protected by free
speech,68 but also discriminated against speech on content and
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Chen & Marceau, supra note 52, at 1470.
Id.
IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2015).
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1204 (D. Idaho 2015).
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.
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viewpoint.69 As established in Cuviello, video recordings are regarded
as expressive activities that are entitled to First Amendment
protection.70 Furthermore, Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission
held that “laws enacted to control or suppress speech may operate at
different parts in the speech process.”71 Thus, laws concerning
suppression of speech are implicated even during the beginning stages
of gathering information that will later be used as speech. The Animal
Legal Defense Fund court indicated that prohibiting undercover
investigators from recording misconduct in agricultural facilities
suppresses a “key type of speech because it limits the information that
might later be published or broadcast,” which is often important for
animal activists and whistleblowers to establish proof, as well as
credibility.72
This aspect of the decision is exceedingly important in our society
because video recordings exposing illegal or disturbing activity are
increasingly prevalent. These types of videos have the purpose and
ability to spark outrage, conversation, and eventual steps toward social
change and evolution. If recording video of specific activities is not
protected speech, the very notion of free speech in America may be
diminished. In other words, if a court upholds a statute prohibiting
the recording of animal abuse on private property without the owner’s
consent, what would stop that same court from upholding a
hypothetical statute that prohibits recording video of violence at a
private workplace?
Additionally, the court found that the ban on audiovisual
recordings of an explicit topic, specifically the “conduct of an
agricultural production facility’s operations,” is particularly dangerous
because it is content based.73 The court identified content-based laws
as laws where “either the underlying purpose of the regulation is to
suppress particular ideas, or if the regulation, by its very terms, singles
out particular content for differential treatment.”74 The court
concluded that the Idaho statute “target[ed] undercover investigators
who intend to publish videos they make through the press and
[sought] to suppress speech critical of animal agricultural practices.”75

69

Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. C-06-5517 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833,
at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007), aff’d, 434 F. App’x 615 (9th Cir. 2011).
71
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 336 (2010).
72
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1204.
73
See id. at 1205.
74
Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009).
75
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
70

LYONS (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

4/16/2017 1:18 PM

COMMENT

925

Further, the Idaho statute targets speech concerning the conduct of
an agricultural production facility’s operations.76 The plaintiffs
claimed that the Idaho statute had the “purpose and effect of stifling
public debate about modern agriculture . . . .”77 The court agreed,
noting that the law plainly sought to “limit and punish those who speak
out on topics relating to the agricultural industry, striking at the heart
of important First Amendment values.”78 The court was not persuaded
by the argument that the statute regulated conduct as opposed to
speech.79
The court illustrated the content-based nature of the statute by
citing McCullen v. Coakley, which upheld a statute that merely restricted
speech depending on where something was said—specifically an
abortion clinic buffer zone—as opposed to what was being said.80
Unlike the statute upheld in McCullen, the statute here is directly
reliant upon speech in the form of audiovisual recordings collected at
agricultural industry facilities.81 Notably, a violation would not occur if
an employee stood inside an agricultural production facility and
filmed the owner having a conversation with his spouse; however, if
that same employee filmed workers abusing animals, the employee
could be prosecuted and face up to a year in jail and be liable for
reputational harm to the owner.82 This highlights the statute’s content
based prohibitive effect because it specifically targets and monitors the
content of the speech, which—here—is animal abuse.
Future courts can also look to Alvarez in their analysis of whether
or not ag-gag laws prohibit content based speech:
The government’s contention in Alvarez, that the Stolen
Valor Act is similar to a federal statute prohibiting lying to a
government official, supports the conclusion that Ag-Gag
laws are content-based restrictions on speech . . . . If a statute
criminalizing lying to a government official is considered a
content-based restriction, then, naturally, laws criminalizing
lying on an employment application are also content-based
restrictions.83

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (2015).
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1199.
See id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1205 (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014)).
See IDAHO CODE § 18-7042.
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1205–06.
Liebmann, supra note 53, at 578.
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C. Animal Legal Defense Fund Found the Statute to be a Content Based
Restriction on Free Speech, and, Therefore, Applied Strict Scrutiny
Since the Animal Legal Defense Fund court accordingly found that
the Idaho statute is a content based restriction on protected speech,
the court applied the highest level of constitutional scrutiny: strict
scrutiny.84 To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have narrowly
tailored the law to further a compelling governmental interest.85 Thus,
the court discussed the asserted governmental interests of the State in
favor of the statute.86 The State claimed the Idaho statute was passed
in order to “protect private property and the privacy of agricultural
facility owners.”87 The court ultimately found that the State’s interest
in protecting personal privacy and private property is an important
interest, but not a compelling interest in the context presented.88 The
court indicated that “historic and traditional categories of expression”
that are not protected by the First Amendment based on compelling
government interests include “obscenity, ‘fighting words,’ defamation,
and child pornography.”89
Further, the court relied on Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
F.C.C., which stated that “[i]t is not enough for the goals of the law to
be legitimate or reasonable” in order to pass strict scrutiny.90 “There
must be some pressing public necessity, some essential value that has to
be preserved; and even then the law must restrict as little speech as
possible to serve the goal.”91 The State in Animal Legal Defense Fund
failed to assert why agricultural production facilities require
heightened protection from these privacy-related crimes.92
Additionally, the court recognized the public’s interest in the safety of
food supply, worker safety, and the humane treatment of animals.93
The court said that “[p]rotecting the private interests of a powerful
industry, which produces the public’s food supply, against public
scrutiny is not a legitimate government interest.”94
Furthermore, a combination of the statute’s legislative history and
overall construction makes it clear that the statute is aimed at
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202–03.
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994).
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012).
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 680.
Id. (emphasis added).
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1210.
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preventing individuals from sharing information about abuse at
factory farms to avoid backlash from the public.95 Yet, certain statutes
that have been introduced in states such as Nebraska, Indiana, and
Wyoming, and passed in states like Missouri96 are constructed to
portray the idea that the state’s main concern is the welfare of the
animals at these agricultural facilities. The same argument was made
in Animal Legal Defense Fund, regarding the Iowa statute.97 Supporters
of the ag-gag law alleged that the undercover investigators failed to
report animal abuse to the dairy operator or the authorities, thus
“allowing additional animal abuse to occur and depriving the animals
of immediate care and treatment.”98 These states form the law under
the pretext that they want the footage to be turned over right away to
prevent any further abuse to the animals. This process prevents the
long-term collection of evidence to show patterns of consistent abuse,
thereby hindering the prosecution of the abusers at a later time.
Animal rights advocates argue this hampers their ability to build a
comprehensive case.99
Additionally, the practical effect of these statutes is that these
videos and long-term investigations are not communicated to the
public, thus stifling the free speech of the animal activists and
whistleblowers. Moreover, the statute is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the protection of privacy because other laws exist that
adequately address this interest.100 There are existing laws against
trespass, fraud, theft, and defamation that protect against privacy
invasion and are narrowly tailored to that interest without encroaching
on free speech.101
IV. UTILIZING REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT TO STRIKE DOWN AG-GAG
LAWS
While the Animal Legal Defense Fund court did not cite Reed in their
opinion, it is likely that future courts will look to Reed to categorize
other ag-gag laws, or the purpose and justification of other ag-gag laws,
as content based. Floyd Abrams, a constitutional lawyer, said Reed

95

Id. at 1206.
S. B. 631, 2012 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
97
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1199.
98
Id.
99
Mike McGraw, ‘Ag-gag’ Law May Have Hindered Report of Animal Cruelty at Missouri
Hog Farm, HARVEST PUB. MEDIA (Oct. 2, 2014), http://harvestpublicmedia.org/article/
ag-gag-law-may-have-hindered-report-animal-cruelty-missouri-hog-farm.
100
Animal Legal Def. Fund, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1208.
101
Id.
96
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“provides significantly enhanced protection for free speech while
requiring a second look at the constitutionality of aspects of federal
and state securities laws, the federal Communications Act and many
others.”102 Robert Post, the dean of Yale Law School, said the decision’s
logic “endangered all sorts of laws, including ones that regulate
misleading advertising and professional malpractice.”103 Still, others
maintain that Reed merely “affirm[ed] that the government cannot ban
speech based on ‘the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed’
unless it has a compelling interest.”104 Although prominent legal minds
differ in their reactions to the decision, most agree that it will have
influential and significant effects on laws that regulate speech.105
Accordingly, Reed will likely be utilized in future cases challenging aggag laws.
Specifically, if future courts are not persuaded by the application
of the content-based statute conclusion in Animal Legal Defense Fund,
they may look to Reed. In Reed, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded
that many laws are now subject to the highest level of review: strict
scrutiny.106 “Speech regulation is content based if a law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed . . . . Whether laws define regulated speech by particular
subject matter or by its function or purpose, they are subject to strict
scrutiny.”107 Even if speech does not discriminate among viewpoints
within a subject matter, a speech regulation targeted at any specific
subject matter is content based.108
Prior to Reed, courts established that government regulation of
speech is content based if the law pertains to specific speech because
of the topic, idea, or message. Thus, with this decision, the Reed court
is at least reaffirming the broad prohibition on content based speech
restrictions. Reed clarifies further that a law is content based if it
specifically addresses a topic, idea, or message “on its face” or draws
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys.109 Further, strict
scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when

102

See Liptak, supra note 8.
Id.
104
David A. Cortman, Supreme Court Decision Ensures Fair Playing Field in Marketplace
of Ideas, JURIST (Aug. 4, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2015/08/davidcortman-freedom-of-speech.php.
105
Id.
106
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231 (2015).
107
Id. at 2222.
108
Id. at 2230.
109
See id. at 2227.
103
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the purpose and justification for the law are content based.110 Laws that
are found to be content based must undergo strict scrutiny by the
court.111
Since many of the ag-gag laws are worded similarly to the Idaho
statute, it is likely that a court will rely on both the ALDF and Reed cases
when framing its analysis of what standard applies in an ag-gag
challenge. Further, the majority of the ag-gag laws target undercover
investigators intending to publish videos of activities at agricultural
facilities.112 In terms of future challenges to statutes that suppress
speech that is specifically critical of the animal agriculture industry, it
is more than likely that courts will find that strict scrutiny applies due
to content-based motives and structure. This type of scrutiny will make
it exceedingly difficult for these ag-gag laws to survive a First
Amendment challenge, since Justice Thomas held that any law that
singles out a topic for regulation discriminates based on content and
is therefore “presumptively unconstitutional.”113
A. Why Existing Ag-Gag Laws Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny
Due to the holding that the Idaho statute is content based, and
thus analyzed by the court under the strict scrutiny test,114 it is likely
that the remaining ag-gag statute challenges will be decided similarly.
The structure of the remaining ag-gag laws is similar to the Idaho
statute, aside from the North Carolina “anti-sunshine” statute.115
The Utah statute prohibits gaining access to agricultural
operations through misrepresentation, as well as intentionally
recording images or sound from the agricultural operation.116 Since
the Utah statute117 is generally worded the same as the Idaho statute,118
it will likely be struck down because it is content based, there is no
compelling governmental interest behind the statute, and the statute
is not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted interest.

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 2222.
See discussion infra Part II.
See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D. Idaho 2015).
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV (A).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2) (LexisNexis 2015).
See id.
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (2015).
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The Iowa,119 Kansas,120 North Dakota,121 and Montana122 statutes all
essentially prohibit individuals from producing, possessing, or
distributing photographs, videos, or any recordings taken at an animal
facility without permission. It is likely that these statutes will undergo
strict scrutiny because the specificity of “animal facility” constitutes
content based suppression of speech under the framework of Animal
Legal Defense Fund combined with the broadened category provided by
Reed. Just as in Animal Legal Defense Fund, a court would not likely find
the use of a compelling governmental interest because the public
interest in knowledge of its food supply and safety is much greater than
the government’s interest in protecting the agricultural facilities from
communal backlash regarding animal abuse. Furthermore, more
narrowly tailored privacy laws exist to promote the agricultural
facilities’ interests in protecting their privacy and property.123
The Missouri statute mandates that employees of animal
agricultural operations who videotape animal abuse must turn over the
footage to law enforcement within twenty-four hours.124 Regardless of
the motives behind this statute, it is important to address its
constitutionality under the First Amendment framework. First, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the First Amendment applies to the
activity that is claimed to be protected.125 As discussed, video
communication is protected under the First Amendment,126 and
therefore, the video footage referenced in the statute is protected
under the First Amendment’s freedom of speech principles. However,
it is possible that the court’s inquiry will end here because the statute
is not actually restricting or prohibiting the speech. Rather, the statute
requires that “employees of animal agricultural operations who
videotape what they suspect is animal abuse must provide the
recording to a law enforcement agency within [twenty-four] hours.”127
Since the Supreme Court of the United States determined that
preventing animal cruelty is not a compelling governmental interest,
courts are not likely to uphold statutes that require or compel the
reporting of animal cruelty.128 This has additional implications for
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A (West 2013).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2013).
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2013).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (West 2013).
See discussion supra Part III.C.
S. B. 631, 2012 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012).
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
See What is Ag-Gag Legislation?, supra note 12.
S. B. 631, 2012 Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012).
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 545–46
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future ag-gag cases where the State may argue that the content-based
speech restriction is narrowly tailored to further the compelling
governmental interest of preventing animal abuse.
Still, the reporting requirement prevents the collection of
evidence to show actual patterns of abuse, thus hindering the
prosecution of the abusers.129 It is likely that the individual will be
forced to leave his or her job at the agricultural facility after he or she
blows the whistle on the organization. If that is the case, the statute
has the effect of regulating the extent to which individuals can film the
abuse and ultimately limits the message individuals can share with
society regarding the particular topic of agricultural industry abuse.
The Wyoming statute makes it a crime to “knowingly or
intentionally” record images or sounds of an agricultural operation
with concealed devices without the owner’s consent.130 In this way, the
statute will likely undergo, but fail, strict scrutiny because of its
similarity to the Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, and Montana
statutes. The statute additionally states that anyone who reports the
abuse to police within forty-eight hours is immune from civil liability.131
While this portion of the statute closely mirrors the Missouri statute, it
only does so in a civil sense, and does not afford any protection from
criminal liability. Thus, it still serves to regulate and prohibit free
speech that has already been established as protected under free
speech principles.
Lastly, a statute in North Carolina, which took effect on January
1, 2016, prohibits individuals from gaining access to the non-public
area of their employer’s property for the purpose of making secret
recordings or removing data or other material.132 The law is different
from any of the previous ag-gag laws because it creates a civil cause of
action, allowing a business to sue for damages.133 This law technically
does not criminalize whistleblowers; however, it allows employers to
pursue civil charges against employees who take photographs or videos
and holds them responsible for any damages incurred, as well as up to
$5,000 per day in punitive damages.134 Further, the statute does not
(1993).
129
McGraw, supra note 99.
130
H. B. 126, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2016).
131
Id.
132
Will Potter, Breaking: New Ag-Gag Bill Introduced in North Carolina on Same Day
Butterball Worker Pleads Guilty to Cruelty, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/north-carolina-ag-gag-whistleblowerlaw/6851/.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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single-out the agricultural industry,135 thus it is unlikely that a court
would find the statute to be content based. This statute, like the
Missouri statute, is slightly more likely to be upheld, but potential farreaching consequences still exist.
On January 13, 2016, a complaint was filed in federal court by
animal rights and consumer groups, including Animal Legal Defense
Fund, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and the Center for
Food Safety, claiming the North Carolina ag-gag statute was
unconstitutional.136 The plaintiffs contended that the ag-gag law
violated rights to free speech, to free press, to petition our
government, and the Equal Protection Clause.137 The plaintiffs further
alleged that the statute was not generally applicable, and would not
create liability for all employees.138 Rather, the statute targeted
“whistleblowers, such as investigative journalists and activists engaged
in undercover investigations, who seek to share information with the
public.”139 In addition, the plaintiffs pointed out that the North
Carolina law, in addition to factory farms, can potentially include other
industries such as nursing homes, financial institutions, and daycare
centers.140 Thus, the law has the potential to punish the reporting of
abuse or misconduct in any of these places. Further, the complaint
alleged that the statute “targets and disproportionately burdens the
press.”141 These infringements are “presumptively unconstitutional,
requiring the state to carry a significant burden in order to preserve
the statute, which it cannot do here.”142
Perhaps indicative of the fate of the North Carolina statute, a
similarly written Tennessee statute died in the state’s legislature.143 The
Tennessee statute, similar to the North Carolina statute, aimed to
punish whistleblowers that attempted to expose employer wrongdoing

135

Id.
Dan Flynn, Activists Challenge NC’s New ‘Ag-Gag’ Law in Federal Court, FOOD SAFETY
NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/01/north-carolinas-newag-gag-law-challenged-in-federal-court/#.VqBMDz_MtMs.
137
See Complaint at 1, PETA v. Cooper, (M.D.N.C. 2016), (No. 16-cv-25)
[hereinafter Cooper Complaint],
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/files/nccomplaint-file-stamped_06044.pdf.
138
Id. at 2.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 3.
142
Id. at 3.
143
Sarah Damian, Tennessee’s Ag Gag (Modeled After North Carolina Law) Didn’t Last
Long, FOOD INTEGRITY CAMPAIGN (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.foodwhistleblower.org/
tennessees-ag-gag-modeled-after-north-carolina-law-didnt-live-long-986/.
136
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in all industries.144 Animal activists urge the public to see the laws for
what they are—attacks on free speech and transparency—even though
the agricultural industry attempts to redesign the statutes to look as
though they are not.145 In North Carolina, the legislature failed to pass
an ag-gag law twice before because the law singled out factory farm
exposés, but they quickly reframed the law to cover all industries.146
Thus, it appears the legislature eluded the issues implicated when they
attempted to regulate content-based speech.
North Carolina
Governor Pat McCrory vetoed the redesigned statute because he
feared it would make it more difficult for employees to report illegal
activity, but the veto was overruled by the state’s legislature.147 Even
with changes to the content-based aspects of the law, the “outcry that
follows revelations about factory farms has led to important policy
changes.”148 Important changes include California’s 2008 initiative to
ban specific types of confinement of farm animals.149
V. CONCLUSION
It is likely that the majority of existing ag-gag laws will be found to
be unconstitutional if challenged, due to their content-based nature
(limited to critical speech on agricultural activity); however, those laws
which merely require the reporting of animal abuse to the authorities
will have a tougher time succeeding in a constitutional challenge.
This Comment recommends that states with the goal of
protecting privacy at agricultural operations utilize the privacy
protection laws already available without prohibiting video recordings.
However, if states find it increasingly important to specifically regulate
these video recordings, the least intrusive and potentially most
constitutional resolution is to require individuals who record animal
abuse to turn the footage over to the police after a specified time
period without requiring the individual to identify themselves publicly.
Under this suggestion, if the individual had obtained employment at
the agricultural facility, he or she could potentially continue his or her
144

Id.
Id.
146
Editorial Board, No More Exposés in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/opinion/no-more-exposes-in-northcarolina.html?_r=2.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Jesse McKinley, A California Ballot Measure Offers Rights for Farm Animals, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/24egg.html
(explaining that an animal rights ballot measure grants California farm animals the
opportunity to spread out instead of being confined to restrictive cages).
145
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work there after any investigation by the authority. Therefore, the
individuals can continue to watch for animal abuse or other
infractions, as well as communicate any message about the agricultural
industry without statutory-induced suppression. This would alleviate
animal activists’ concerns that they will not be able to obtain and share
long-term documented footage that shows patterns of prolonged
animal abuse.
Still, others argue that even reframing the ag-gag laws will still not
lead to favorable outcomes, claiming the burden of the laws outweighs
the benefit.150 These opponents argue that the agricultural industry
and the state legislatures should make efforts to explain agricultural
practices to the public, making the industry more transparent and
shifting the focus from the messenger to the message.151 Nathan
Runkle, founder and president of Mercy for Animals, said, “[t]he
industry should be teaming up with organizations like ours to put
cameras in these facilities, to advocate for mandatory training and have
real euthanasia policies, things that would allow the public to trust
these operations rather than fear them.”152 Perhaps the impending
litigation surrounding ag-gag laws will inspire these facilities to
reevaluate their policies surrounding animal abuse.

150
151
152

See Liptak, supra note 8, at 1176.
Id.
Hobson, supra note 16.

